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INDUCTIVE 



PSYCHOLOGY, 



AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 



Study of Mental Phenomena, 



PREPARED FOR THE FIRST TERM'S WORK IN 

PSYCHOLOGY IN THE STATE NORMAL 

SCHOOL AT WINONA, MINN. 




BY 

E^A. KIRKPATRICK, B. S., M. Ph., 

(Lately Fellow of Clark University.) 

Instructor in Psychology. 



^ WINONA, MINN.: 
Jones & Kroeger, Printers, 

1893. -; 



y^ 



'?^ 



x^\ 



y- 



tx 



Entered according to Act of Congress in the year 1893, by 

E. A. KIRKPATRICK, 
In the office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington. 



PRBKACK. 

3 natural sciences 
plants, animals? 
is believed that 
3f those subjects 
knowledge and 
^ .. ^j v^wiiorete and induct- 
ive study. This little volume is prepared in the 
belief that the same thing is true in an even 
greater degree in the study of psychology. The 
study of abstract psychology and of the thor- 
oughly dried specimens of mental phenomena 
given for illustration by psychologists lead the 
pupil to accept on faith classifications, principles 
and laws that he can neither observe, verify, or 
apply, and not only fails to give him the knowledge 
and power he should gain from the study, but is 
often useless and even worse than useless. To 
gain real knowledge and power, the pupil must 
observe and analyze the actual processes of his 
own mind and those of others, instead of taking 
what the author tells him about imaginary mental 



\iX^ 






Entered according t 
E. 
In the office of the L. 



PRBKACK. 



In no progressive school are the natural sciences 
now taught without the use of plants, animals) 
apparatus and experiments. It is believed that 
the abstract and deductive study of those subjects 
fails in giving students the real knowledge and 
power that may be gained by concrete and induct- 
ive study. This little volume is prepared in the 
belief that the same thing is true in an even 
greater degree in the study of psychology. The 
study of abstract psychology and of the thor- 
oughly dried specimens of mental phenomena 
given for illustration by psychologists lead the 
pupil to accept on faith classifications, principles 
and laws that he can neither observe, verify, or 
apply, and not only fails to give him the knowledge 
and power he should gain from the study, bnt is 
often useless and even worse than useless. To 
gain real knowledge and power, the pupil must 
observe and analyze the actual processes of his 
own mind and those of others, instead of taking 
what the author tells him about imaginary mental 



— 4 — 

processes, and he must be led to observe, judge, 
and think for himself. The teacher, if he is to 
make any practical use of psychology whatever in 
his profession, must study it in the concrete. 

It is now generally recognized that expression 
is an important factor in making acquisitions 
clear, precise and permanent. In no other study 
is written expression so helpful and even absolutely 
necessary as in psychology, hence the results of 
the study of every topic should always be expressed 
in writing by the pupil. 

This little volume does not claim to be a com- 
plete or a strictly scientific treatise, upon the in- 
tellectual powers, but it does aim to develop the 
real psychological knowledge and power necessary 
to pursue the subject understandingly either in 
books or in daily life and in the school room. The 
last chapter is nothing but an outline. From one 
to two weeks can profitably be spent upon it and 
at the close the students will have arrived at all of 
the fundamental principles of mental development. 

The work is prepared specially for use in the 
author's own classes, but should other teachers of 
psychology and teachers' reading circles find 
themselves in accord with the ideas set forth in 
this preface, and impressed with the belief that 
they are partially realized in the use of this book, 
it will be revised with special reference to tliier 
needs. 

E. A. K. 

Winona, Minn., June 15, 1893. 



CONTBNTS. 



CHAPTER I.— Introduction. 
Definition and Scope of Psychology. 
Method. 

Inferential Observations— How Made. 
Probability of the Inferences. 

Three Methods of Studying Psychology — Subjective, 
Indirectly Subjective and Objective. 

Divisions of Psychology. 

CHAPTER II.— General Intellectual Powers. 

Consciousness. 
Attention. 

Nature and Limits. 

Importance and Selective Character. , 

Kinds. 

Voluntary Attention. 

Conditions Favoring and Means of Developing Atten- 
tion. 

Signs of Attention. 

CHAPTER III.— Special Intellectual Powers. 
General Divisions— Presentation, Representation and 

Thinking. 
The Presentative Powers. 

Sensation. \ 

Discrimination. ^-->,.^^^^^ 

Inferred Diiferences. \ 

Perception. 

Illusions. 

Apperception. 

Directions for the Study of Individual Pupils. 



— 6 — 

CHAPTER I v.— The Representative Powers. 

Mental Images. 

Imagination — Reproductive, Constructive and Creative, 

Directions for the Study of Individual Pupils. 

Association and Memory. 

Association — Kinds and Laws. 

Memory — Retention, Recall and Recognition. 

Directions for the Study of Individual Pupils. 

CHAPTER v.— Thinking. 
Nature and Divisions. 
Conception. 

Class Concepts. 

Degrees of Definiteness of Concepts. 

Extension and Intension. 

Modification. 

Analysis and Abstraction and Abstract Concepts. 

Classification and Generalization. 
Judgment. 

Basis and Accuracy of Judgment. 
Directions for the Study of Individual Pupils. 
Reasoning. 

Nature. 

Two Kinds. 

General Truths. 

Reasoning and Inference. 

Relation of Analysis and Synthesis to Reasoning. 

Conditions Favoring Success and Accuracy in Reasoning, 
Directions for the Study of Individual Pupils. 

CHAPTER YI.— Outline for the Study of Habit. 



— 7 



CHAPTEE I. 

INTKODUCTION. 

Definition and Scope of Psychology. Name live 
different subjects of study and state what kind of 
facts each one deals with. Name five different 
occupations and state what kind of acts are per- 
formed and materials dealt with. What is a 
science ? Consult a dictionary and compare the 
difinition with what you know of the use of the 
word. Name four sciences and state what kind 
of things each one deals with. 

Just as other sciences are concerned with a cer- 
tain order of facts, so is Psychology. In one 
respect its scope is broader than that of any other 
science, for it treats of the mind, by which all 
subjects are studied, all industries carried on and 
all sciences developed. Name specifically, then, 
some of the facts with which this science deals. 
Psychology must classify all of these facts and 
determine the laws that control all thinking, feel- 
ing and willing. 



8- 



METHOD. 



Siiice we are to study this science we must 
inquire first how it is to be studied. In other 
sciences we observe, classify, experiment and 
infer, and in this we must do the same. There 
are difficulties in the way, however. When study- 
ing botany I may observe the half dozen plants in 
the window and classify tliem. .1 may experiment 
upon them by placing one in the shade and leaving 
another without water. One fades and the other 
dries up, and I infer that the others would do the 
same under like circumstances. You or any one 
else can observe the same plants, decide whether 
or not my classification is correct, repeat my ex- 
periments and judge for yourself as to the correct- 
ness of my inferences. Let us now make a 
psychological study. When I looked at the plants 
certain thoughts came to me, feelings were aroused 
and certain resolutions made. I noted them and 
was, perhaps, surprised at the number of thoughts, 
the intensity of the feelings, and the strength of 
the resolutions. At another time I do the same 
thing with a group of plants, note my thoughts, 
feelings and resolutions, compare them with those 
experienced before and, perhaps, reach certain 
conclusions. It was possible for you to make the 



1 



— 9 — 

same botanical observations and experiments that 
I made, but can you make the same psychological 
observations and experiments ? Is it possible for 
you to observe what my thoughts and feelings 
were when I .looked at the plants ? Notice what 
thoughts and feeling are passing through your 
mind as you look at this book. Can any one else 
observe them ? Do you know what thoughts are 
passing through the mind of any one else in the 
room ? 

iVre we warranted in saying that Psychology 
differs from other sciences in that its facts cannot 
be directly observed by but one individual, while 
those of other sciences can be observed by any 
number of individuals ? Give illustrations and 
reasons in favor of your view. Would this be an 
advantage or a disadvantage ? 

Inferential Observations — How Made. If we cannot 
observe what is going on in the mind of another, 
we can infer to some extent. Leaving out of 
account what they may have said, give specific 
examples of how you have inferred the thoughts, 
feelings or determinations of others, stating upon 
what facts your inferences were based (tone of 
voice, change in color, movement of hand or of 
facial muscles, etc. ) 



10 



Possibility of these Inferences. How is it that we 
infer that a companion is experiencing a feeling of 
pleasure when we see a peculiar movement of the 
lips or brightness in the eyes ? or that a child 
understands our explanations when we see nothing 
but the movements of the muscles of the face^ 
which we describe as the lighting up of his coud- 
tenance ? If we had never experienced a feeling 
of pleasure, and smiled, could we make the first 
inference ? Can we infer anything that is passing 
in the mind of another except something similar 
to what we have experienced ? Try to find some 
instances, but analyze them very closely before 
accepting them. 

Probability of Our Inferences. What reason have 
we for believing that other people have thoughts 
and feelings like our own when they act as we do ? 
Do we know that they have any thoughts and feel- 
ings at all, any more than other moving things, as 
the clock on the wall, or the engine on the track ? 
We all believe that they have and now let us see 
if we can find a basis for that belief. 

Notice the variations in the belief in different 
cases. Can you understand the thoughts and 
feelings of a cannibal or an Indian as well as you 
can those of a man of your own race and state of 



— 11 — 

civilization? of a murderer and thief as well as you 
can one of your own disposition ? of an artist or 
scientist as well as one of your own ability and 
culture ? of an infant or aged person as well as 
' one of your own age? In all of these cases the 
bodily form, the nervous system and all the means 
of expressing thought and feeling are nearly the 
same, but the surroundings, the state of develop- 
ment and the history are different. 

Again, we believe that animals have thoughts 

i and feelings, and we think that we can interpret, 

I though with less certainty than those of men, 

j those of the higher mammals, as the horse, dog or 

I monkey, and in a less measure those of birds, such 

' as the crow, parrot, hen. The first have forms, 

; nervous systems and means of expression different, 

yet similar to our own, and the latter a nervous 

system much the same. In the case of reptiles 

there is some similarity of nervous structure, but 

we do not claim to know much about the thoughts 

' and feelings of an alligator, a snake or a frog. 

Still less does the form and nervous system of 

insects resemble our own, and we hesitate to infer 

anything as to the feelings and thoughts of a fly, 

a beetle, a butterfly or a worm. Still less can we 

aflBrm about the mental life of an oyster, and we 



— 12 — 

may even doubt that a sponge, a coral or an 
amoeba has any consciousness, for they have no 
brain and no distinct nervous system of any kind. 

Again, we ascribe no thought to the rustling 
leaves and growing gra^ss, or to machines, as wej 
watch the complicated movements of the thrash-j 
ing machine or the printing press. 

From these examples are we not justified in say-j 
ing that one basis of our belief that other human 1 
beings have thoughts and feelings like our own, 
which they express in a similar way, is their simi-| 
larity to ourselves, and that the probability ot\ 
inferences in regard to the thoughts and feelings 
of men and animals is proportional to the simi- 
larity in nervous structure and in history ? This 
may seem an unsatisfactory basis for psychological 
inferences, but is it not the same basis as that 
used in other sciences ? 

The probability of the inference that other plants 
will fade or die, if deprived of sunshine or water, 
after the same period as the ones tested, will be 
proportional to their similarity to them in kind, 
age and condition. Give other illustrations and 
from other sciences. 

The relation of language to such inferences in 
psychology is worthy of thought and discussion 
if time permits. 



— 13 — 

The Three Methods of Studying Psychology. First 
— It is evident that each one can observe his own 
thoughts and feelings, classify them and determine 
the relations existing between them. Since in 
doing this he makes himself the subject of study, 
we call this the subjective method. This is the 
most direct method that there is, but it presents 
some difficulties. Try to observe just how you 
feel when you are very angry or very happy, just 
how your mind works when you are attending 
closely to a lesson or trying to understand an 
i explanation. Now state the difficulties that you 
meet with in trying to make your observations ac- 
curately. For similar reasons it is difficult to make 
experiments and observe results. Even if the 
observations are accurate, and we correctly deter- 
mine aijd classify the relations of the various phe- 
nomena of our own mind, it does not follow that 
they were the same when we were children, or will 
be when we get old. Nor are we justified in 
inferring that the phenomena of other minds and 
the laws governiog them are the same as for our 
own. That the phenomena are not the same may 
be shown by noticing what comes into your mind 
when the word ''hat" is spoken, and asking others 
what they think of upon hearing the word. From 



14 — 



% 



what has already been said it is evident that what 
we find true for our own minds is true for other 
minds only so far as their inherited organization, 
history and age are the same. 

Second. We may study psychological facts in 
an indirect manner. We may take the recorded 
results of subjective study by a number of differ- 
ent individuals, compare them, determine what is 
common to all and true of ourselves, and what is 
not. In this way we may find that many things 
that we thought true for all minds were true for 
only one or a few, and thus the inaccuracies of the 
purely subjective method may be corrected. (Very 
striking illustrations of the truth of this state- 
ment may be obtained by inquiring among your 
friends whether they see certain colors when cer- 
tain letters or sounds are named, and whether, 
when they hear numbers, they think of the visual 
figures in a certain position.) 

There is a difficulty in this use of the method, 
however, due to the fact that the words used 
may not mean the same. When speaking of 
external objects we can point them out to another 
and name them; thus, 'Hhis is a chair," ''that is a 
tree," "this movement is walking," etc., but in 
describing mental states this can not be done so 



— 15 — 

readily. Tims, "the pain I feel now is an ache," 
^' this mental act is a conception," "that a sensa- 
tion/' means but little to you, for you cannot ob- 
serve what is in my mind so as to know exactly 
what I mean, hence there are considerable differ- 
ences as to the meaning of those words. The 
classifications of mental phenomena in accordance 
with the language of the different observers may 
therefore be very inaccurate. 

The indirect method may be used with con- 
siderable accuracy in other ways, however. If a 
man says he has a "distinct" mental image of a 
certain building, or a "fairly distinct" one, or 
" only a vague" one, he is speaking from the stand- 
point of his own experience and comparing his 
mental image of that building with his mental 
images of other things, and you do not know what 
I his words mean. If, however, you ask him to 
describe or draw the building, you can judge 
fairly well as to the distinctness of his mental 
image. Bearing this in mind, all literature may 
serve as valuable material for psychological study. 
\ Give illustrations. 

The indirect method of study may be made still 
more exact by means of careful experiments. You 
can find the number of words an individual can 



— 16 — 

remember after hearing them once by having 
him repeat them, the number of words he can reac 
in a minute by timing him, the amount of diflfer- 
ence in weight, length, color or loudness, betweei 
two weights, lines, colors or sounds, by finding 
what proportion of times he can correctly stat< 
the difference, etc. This kind of psychologica 
study, (which is now one of the most promisin 
fields of research in psychology,) is called psychoi 
physics. Can you tell why ? Is a psychological 
test being made when a pupil is asked to work 
certain problem ? Give other examples of test 
that may be made the basis for psychological 
study. 

Again, we may study psychology by the indirect 
method without experiment or the use of language. 
If we notice what attitude and expression of coun- 
tenance we assume, or what special movements we 
make when we experience certain thoughts and 
feelings we have a basis for inferringthe thoughts 
and feelings of others. Give some examples of 
psychological inferences of this kind that you have 
made. 

Can you see just why all the ways of studying 
psychology just described may be called indirect 
or indirectly subjective ? 



— 17 — 

Third. There is another method which has 
been of much use to psychology in the past few 
years, although some have denied that such study 
is properly a part of psychology. Both men and 
animals have nerves, a brain and muscles. With- 
out nerves they would be incapable of receiving 
sensations of pain, color, sound, or, in short, of 
being affected in any way by objects. If there 
were nerves, but no brain to which they might go, 
feeling and thought would be impossible. AVith- 

\ out muscles motion would be impossible, and 

I without motion there could be no expression of 
thought by language, gestures or change of 
countenance. The nervous and the muscular sys- 

( tem may be looked upon as a very complex 
machine. Much time has been spent in studying 
the structure of the nerves and their end organs, 
the brain, and the muscles and the nerves con- 
necting them with the brain, with the view of 
determining the function of each and the rela- 

I tion of each to all. Such a study is a part of 
physiology and may be carried on without any 
more thought of the thoughts and feelings that 
accompany the activity of its various parts than 
the botanist in studying the functions of the 
different parts of a plant, or a mechanic studying^ 



— 18 — 

tlie workings of a complex machine. While this 
is true, and one with a good nervous and muscular 
system may be able to think and act, call all 
the parts into activity, without any knowledge 
of the structure of the apparatus with which 
he works or of the parts employed in each activity, 
yet it is clear from cases of injured or defective 
nervous systems, that the perfectness of mental 
activity is limited by the perfectness of the j 
nervous system, which is the organ of that activ- ' 
ity. A comparison of the results of physiological J 
study with the results of psychological study by 
the other methods, has thrown a great deal of light t 
on many disputed questions, and made our knowl- \ 
edge of others much more definite and precise. | 
This last method gives us the branch of the sub- I 
ject known as physiological psychology. i 

We have, then, the three ways of studying 
psychology, the subjective method, in which we ' 
observe our own minds, the indirectly subjective, 
in which we study the mental activities of others 
from the words they use and the motions they make, 
and the objecUve method, in which we study the 
apparatus (brain muscle and nerves,) by which 
the mental activities are carried on and expressed. 
Give examples of facts you have gotten in each of 
these three ways. 






19 



DIVISIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY. 

The facts of mind are very diverse and it is a 
part of the work of psychology to simplify the 
study of mind, by classifying under a common 
name all similar mental phenomena. The most 
general and the most universally accepted classifi- 
cation is illustrated by the following example : 
Entering a book store I see an apparatus, which, 
after some examination, I perceive to be a dictionary 
holder. I am very much pleased with the way in 
which it works, feel a strong desire to own it. 
After learning the price and considering that in 
relation to my means and to other things that I 
wish, I buy it. That act of mind by which I dis- 
tinguish the dictionary holder from other objects 
and recognize its value, is an act of knowing, an 
intellectual act, a cognitive act. The pleasure and 
desire experienced as I examined it was a feeling 
or emotion, an excitation of the sensibilities. The 
resolve to purchase the dictionary holder was a 
volition, an act of the will. The powers of the 
mind are classified as kno\\ing, feeling and willing. 
In the majority of our mental acts all three of 
these powers of the mind are exhibited, but 
usually one is more prominent than the others. 

For convenience in studying it, however, the 



— 20 — 

mind is usually divided into three divisions, the 
intellect, the sensibilities and the will, and we 
shall follow that division, remembering all the 
time, however, that the three powers of the mind 
are exhibited together in reality, and that we study 
them separately only that we may not be confused 
by the multitude of things to be noticed at one 
time. 

Be prepared to give not less than five examples 
illustrating each of these powers of the mind. 

Is there ever cognition without feeling ? Can 
there be feeling without any cognition ? 

Is will necessary to cognition or to feeling ? 
Does it have any effect upon them ? Would will 
be possible without intellect ? Would action be 
possible ? If so, would you call it willing ? 

Do we ever will without feeling ? If we had 
no sensibilities could or would we ever will to do 
anything? 



21 



CHAPTER 11. 

GENERAL INTELLECTUxiL POWERS. 

Consciousness. If one is asleep or has received a 
severe blow on the head, we say that he is uncon- 
scious, which indicates that we know in a general 
way what is meant by consciousness. One of the 
distinctions we make between the actions of a 
man and a machine is that he is conscious of his 
actions. This consciousness of our own actions, 
our thoughts and the effects produced upon us by 
surrounding objects, is the necessary condition of 
intelligence, feeling and will, but if classified with 
either division of mind, it should be classified with 
the intellect. We may look upon it as the elemen- 
tary or rather the unspecialized form of intelli- 
gence, which may assume a variety of forms, both 
simple and complex, and be intensified in various 
degrees. Just stop for a little while and note 
down all of the things of which you are conscious 
at the present time. Are you ever conscious of 
what is going on in your own mind and entirely 



— 22 — 

unconscious of what is going on around you ? 
Are you ever conscious only of the effect outside 
things are producing upon you ? 

Is there any difference between having knowl- 
edge of a thing and being conscious of it ? Illus- 
trate. 

Attention — Nature and Limits. When you named" 
the various things of which you were conscious, 
you found that the sense of sight, of toucJi and of 
hearing were being affected all of the time by 
various surrounding objects, that your bodily 
condition was affecting it and that various 
thoughts were flitting through your mind. All of 
these things were occurring simultaneously, but as 
you named them was your consciousness of them 
equally intense, or were you distinctly conscious 
of one, then of another, as you named them ? 
When you are observing very closely the chair 
before you, do you not become almost entirely 
unconscious of all other things that are affecting 
your senses ? This intensification of conscious- 
ness upon fewer or but one of the many things 
that are affecting it, is called attention. It may be 
to an external object or to a thought in the mind. 
Attention is quite analogous to the focusing of the 
eye upon a single object at a time. Indicate as 



— SB- 
many points of analogy between the two as you 
can. Looking upon attention as an intensification 
of consciousness upon one of the things present 
to it, it is e\'ident that it may be of all degrees. 
The minimum degree would be mere couscious- 
ness with the slightest possible intensification 
upon one object, and the maximum consciousness 
of nothing else but the one object of attention — 
not even conscious of self and surroundings. 
Have you ever been attentive in the maximum 
degree ? Have you ever known any one else who 
was ? 

Can you attend in a minimum degree to more 
than one thing at a time ? As a help in answer- 
ing this question, have a friend throw down several 
similar objects while you attempt to state the 
number instantly without counting or grouping 
them. With how many objects can you do this 
correctly every time ? This indicates in a measure 
j . how many external things you can attend to at 
once. 

Now, in order to find how many mental pro- 
cesses you can attend to at once, try the following 
experiments. Repeat a poem and work a simple 
problem in arithmetic at the same time. Notice 
whether you attend to -both processes at once, or 



— 24 — 

your attention flits from one to the other. As a 
further means of determining this question find 
how long it takes to repeat the poem alone, how 
long to work the problem alone, then how long to 
do both at once. In order to make this test fairly 
it may be necessary to take another problem equally 
difficult but involving different combinations. 
For further tests try working a problem mentally 
while solving another on paper, repeating one 
poem while writing another, or writing a sentence 
wnth one hand, another with the other, while 
repeating a third or performing an arithmetical 
operation. In any of the above experiments is|. I 
there any saving of time by doing two or morql 
things at once ? Is there in any of the commoB 
tasks ? 

What kind of acts can best be done at the sam^ 
time others are being done, new or habitua 
acts ? Can two acts that are similar or two tha 
are different best be performed at the same time 
e. g., repeating poem and adding, or repeating one 
poem and writing another ? 

Importance of Attention and its Selective Character. 
Since of all the objects that are affecting our 
senses and of all the thoughts that are passing 
through our minds, we can attend in a degree 



— 25 — 

above the minimum to but very few, it follows 
that much of what is potentially within the 
sphere of our mental life is actually almost 
non-existent. There are individual differences as 
to the number of things attended to and the 
intensity of the attention. Would it be safe to 
say that the amount of knowledge acquired by any 
individual is directly proportional to the degree 
and extent of his attention ? Can you trace any 
analogy between plants and men as to what they 
take in of their surroundings ? What observa- 
tions have you made upon pupils showing differ- 
ence in knowledge corresponding to difference in 
attention? Which is the more important that a 
pupil should be supplied with plenty of books and 
objects for study and should be given good expla- 
nations regardless of what his attention might be, 
or that he should be kept attentive to whatever is 
presented however little it may be? Which is the 
most important, that the subject should be pre- 
sented to a class completely and logically, or that 
the attention of the class should be secured to 
whatever is presented? 

There are individual differences not only as to 
the degree of attention and the number of things 
attended to, but also as to the kind of things 



I 



— 26 — 

attended to. It is not possible, and probably not 
desirable to attend to everything aftecting us, (Do 
you think it would be ?) but the question of what 
kind of things we attend to is a matter of con- 
siderable importance. How many of you can tell 
the number of steps in the stairs or the number 
of windows in the assembly room ? This illus- 
trates the truth of the statement made above. 
Give others. 

Now, from your own thoughts and observations,, 
give examples of individual differences as to the 
things attended. Suggestion : notice men of dif- 
ferent occupations when observing or reading the 
same thing. Notice differences between yourself 
and your companions; between men and women;, 
children and adults, etc. Would it be possible for 
two individuals surrounded by the same things^ 
and thoughts brought up in the same way, to ac^ 
quire a different stock of knowledge and develop a 
different character, because of a difference in atten- 
tion ? Illustrate and give reasons. 

Themes for writing : '' Importance of Atten- 
tion." " Individual Differences as to the Things^ 
Attended To." 

Kinds of Attention. As already indicated, atten- 
tion may be either to external things or to internal 



— 27 — 

thoughts. In either case the attention may be 

with or without effort. If effort is necessary in 

order to keep the attention upon the object or 

idea, we say that the attention is voluntary, but if 

I the object or idea by its intensity or peculiarity 

excites and holds the attention, then we designate 

it as non-voluntary or involuntary attention. 

Properly speaking, however, it is involuntary only 

; when it is difficult or impossible to turn it to other 

I things. Give three examples of each of these 

( three kinds of attention in your own experience. 

I What proportion of your attention to the things 

1 around you is non-voluntary ? AVhen not studying 

j what proportion of your thoughts are voluntary ? 

Be ready to indicate what part pleasure and pain, 

novelty of the thing presented, and natural suscep- 

I tibility to certain impressions play in non-volun- 

;tary attention. Whatever excites attention may 

'be called a stimulus to attention. What is the 

' relation of intensity of stimuli to attention ? 

Voluntary Attention. Whenever any effort is 
j made to direct or hold the attention it is to that 
^extent voluntary. Hence voluntary attention may 
enforce non-voluntary, or it may oppose it, decid- 
ing which of two equally attractive objects shall 
be attended to, or even produce attention to an 



— 28 — 



I 



1 



unattractive object. Give the best example o 
stronpj volantary attention that you can conceive 
of. Give the best within your own experience: 
within your own observation. Give your opinion 
of the value of the power of voluntary attention, 
What is the relation between attention and inters 
est ? Is voluntary attention ever the result oJ 
immediate interest in the thing attended to, or ia 
some derived interest always necessary to vol 
untary attention? (or in other words, some reason 
in the way of results why we should attend to th 
thiug in hand.) 

How long can you attend continuously to one 
subject of thought ? How long can a child of 
three, of five, of ten, attend to one thing ? Give 
illustrations, from your observations or reading, of 
long continued attention to one thing. After you 
have attended to one thing for a long while do you 
ever find it difficult to attend to something else ? 
Do people that have the power to attend to one 
thing for a long while often lack the power to 
quickly change their attention from one thing to 
another? Write out your ideal of the kind and 
power of attention one should possess. 

Conditions Favoring and Means of Developing 
Power of Attention. Non- voluntary and voluntary 



— 29 — 

attention are very closely related and the latter 
must be developed out of the former, yet the 
latter frequently changes after a little time to the 
former. Do yoa continue to exercise your will 
after you become interested in your lesson? The 
fact that pure voluntary attention can be main- 
tained for but a short time may be illustrated by 
the following experiment: Find how long you can 
attend to a simple point or line without thinking 
of anything else, simply by determining to do so. 
< Now try the same experiment again, asking your- 
self questions about it — its size, shape, color, dis- 
I tance from other lines or points, etc. In the latter 
I case there is a frequent change in the mental 
attitude, and this change excites non- voluntary 
; attention, which makes it possible for voluntary 
I attention to be maintained much longer. How 
i long can you get a child to attend to a piece of 
'chalk by simply telling him to study it? How 
'long by asking him questions about it and having 
i him state what he sees. Would this be a safe 
i statement: "No one can attend to one thing for 
] more than a few moments unless the thing itself 
changes or he changes his mental attitude toward 
I it — thinks of it in a different way or in relation to 
other things?" 



— 30 — 

In order to understand more fully what is 
involved in attending to a thing, make this 
experiment: Count all of the *' m's " on this page; 
now count all of the " a's". What mental images, 
if any, were in your mind in these two cases? If 
present is it possible for you to count rapidly or 
accurately without them? Why is it, if you are 
hunting for a lost thing, you want to know how 
it looks? Is it necessary to have some kind of a 
mental image of an object in order to attend to it? 

Is some knowledge of a subject necessary to 
attention to it? Have you observed children inat- 
tentive because of want of knowledge of the thing 
being presented? 

Referring back to the question of change in 
mental attitude as necessary to continued atten- 
tion, is considerable knowledge necessary to 
change of mental attitude? Notice what knowl- 
edge is required to ask many questions about 
chalk. Is extensive knowledge a favorable condi- 
tion for attention? 

Illustrate the fact that novelty is favorable to 
attention. Now what is the relation of novelty of 
the thing presented to a child and his knowledge 
of something like it, to the degree of interest and 
attention it secures from him? 



— 31 — 

Problem: How may the attention of a class be 
secured, and how may power of attention be 
developed in children? Which is the easier to 
attend to, words already written, or words the 
teacher is writing? pictures or maps that are 
already drawn, or those being drawn? Why? 
Which will develop attention most, asking a class 
such questions as, ''What are three times four, 
three times two," etc., or asking them to tell 
''What three times each of the following numbers 
is: three, four," etc.? AVhy? Can you illustrate 
any other method of developing voluntary atten- 
tion? Which is the most favorable to the main- 
tenance of attention, asking a question then 
calling on a pupil, or calling on a pupil then asking 
a question? What is the effect of expectancy or 
a belief that something new or important is about 
to be presented? How may expectancy be excited? 

i Topics for writing: "How the attention of a 
class may be secured," "Means to be used in 
developing power of voluntary attention in a 

rj child who lacks it." 

Signs of Attention. Since attention is such an 
Important factor in all learning, it is necessary 

1 that a teacher should be able to tell when a child 
is attentive or, in other words, to interpret the 



— 32 — 

signs of attention. In studying this, some obser> 
vations upon yourself will be of value. Relax all 
of your muscles, then attend intently to some- 
thing without contracting any of them. Can you 
do it? Do you think the attitude a pupil assumes 
has any effect upon his attention? 

In your own case what movements, if any, do 
you make when attending to something in the 
building to be seen? Something heard? Now 
attend to some idea in your own mind — perhaps 
of something you have seen at some distant placefl 
or time. Do your movements or feelings diflPer 
from those in attending to external things? Is 
change of attention ever possible without move- 
ment? 

In the light of these experiments and your 
observations of others, be prepared to state as 
specifically as possible just what are the signs by 
which you can tell when a pupil is attending to 
what is being presented, and when he is attending 
to some subject he is reading or thinking about. 



li 



33 



CHAPTEK III. 

SPECIAL INTELLECTUAL POWEES — PRESENTATION. 

General Divisions. In studying attention, which 
|we described as tlie intensification of conscions- 
[DBss, we were obliged to take some account of the 
jfeelings and the will — interest being dependent 
jupon feeling and voluntary attention upon will. 
*jAs we pass from the general to the more special 
intellectual powers w^e shall still find a close rela- 
tion existing between these powers and the feel- 
jings and will. 

Let us now take an example of mental activity 
and see if we can classify the intellectual powers 
(exhibited in it. I go to a city I have never visited 
ibefore, pass through its streets and observe closely 
all of its buildings. That is, I am cognizant of' 
what is present to my senses. I go home perhaps 
[thinking of other things, but when the name ol 
jthe city is mentioned there comes up in my mind, 
a mental picture of it just as it appeared wheiu 



I 



— 34 — 

I was looking at it. That is, I am cognizant 
of a representation of what has previously 
been presented. Then perhaps I begin to 
compare the city with others that I have seen, 
classify its different buildings, think of their uses, 
try to determine why it should have so many of 
one kind, etc. That is, I use my cognitive powers 
in comparing what is represented with representa- 
tions of what I have seen at other times and place?^ 
i. e, I think. We have illustrated by this example 
three different powers of the mind, (which we shall' 
see later include several others,) viz: preseniaiive, 
or the power to know objects actually present; rep^- 
resentative, or the power to represent objects pre- 
viously known but not now present; thinking, or 
the power to compare, classify and reason about 
things presented and represented. All of these 
powers may be exercised together, yet they are, to 
a considerable extent, . different. We perceive 
what is present, we represent or form a mental 
image of what is not present, and we think about 
things perceived and represented. Give examples 
of the exercise of each of these powers. \ 

The faculty or power of the mind exercised in 
perceiving is called perception and the same wor« 
is used to indicate the act of perceiving. The result 



— 35 — 

of perceiving is called a percept. The power by 
which we represent what has been previously per- 
ceived is called imagination and the same term is 
applied to the act of representing. The represen- 
' tation itself is called a mental image. Is there 
any other difference between a percept and a 
' mental image besides the principal one that in one 
' case the object is present and in the other it is 
' not? 

Sensation. I hold up this book and you perceive 
1 it, but if you had no eyes you would not know of 
i its presence unless I let it fall, and of that you 
i would not be conscious if you were deaf. I place 
it in your hand and you perceive it, but if, as is 
sometimes the case, you were unable to feel it, 
then you could not perceive it in that way. If it 
had no taste and no odor you could not perceive it 
unless it should be by the resistance it offered to 
the movement of your hands. It would be to you 
as if it were non-existent and the same would be 
♦true of every other object. You might represent 
'and think ab^ut things you had previously seen, 
'heard, felt, etc., but you could gain no new 
knowledge. You might know something of your 
own bodily state, whether sick or well, tired or 
rested, hungry or satisfied, etc., but nothing could 



— 36 — 

you know of your surroundings. Your mine 
might be just as ready for action as ever, but if 
the sense organs, the eyes, ears and the little 
nerve endings in the skin, mouth and tongue, were 
destroyed or the nerves connecting them with the 
brain were cut, no stimulus from the outside 
world could reach your brain to call the presenta- 
tive powers of your mind into action. 

Normally, when light falls upon the eye, a ner- 
vous impulse passes along the optic nerve, reaches 
the brain, exciting a certain portion of it to activity! 
the mind experiences what is called a sensation o{ 
light. In a similar way sound waves falling upon, 
the organs of the ear cause a nervous impulse to 
pass along the auditory nerve, exciting a certain 
portion of the brain to activity and producing a 
sensation of sound. Touching the skin, the action 
of food upon the tongue and of odors upon th^ 
olfactory membrane produce nervous impulses 
that arouse sensations of touch, taste and smelL ' 
Movements of any part of the body also produce 
nervous impulses that result in sensations of 
movement. Although each of these organs are 
specially adapted for receiving a certain kind of 
stimulous, the eye of light, the ear of sound, etc., 
yet if the optic nerve is stimulated in any way (a& 



— 37 — 

by a jar when one falls, or artifically by elec- 
tricity,) a sensation of light is produced. So, 
also, if the auditory nerve is stimulated in 
any way a sensation of sound is experienced, and 
so of the other nerves. 

Tet a perfect sense organ and a nervous impulse 
passing to the brain is not all that is necessary to 
produce a sensation, for if one is unconscious as 
when asleep no sensation is produced by the sound 
I waves falling upon the ear or a pressure upon the 
'} hand. It is the effect produced upon conscious- 
', ness by the incoming nervous impulses that con- 
j stitutes a sensation. The effect is, in fact, a 
feeling, but the intellect cognizes the existence of 
the feeling and distinguishes it from other feel- 
ings. The mere consciousness of the light, the 
sound or the odor, or the sensation proper, is as 
much a feeling as a cognition, but the act of distin- 
guishing between the different kinds and degrees 
of sensation, which is an essential element in per- 
ception, is almost wholly an act of the intellect. 

The simple sensations given by the special 
senses are: color and variation in light and shade, 
I by the eye; sounds of different pitch and intensity, 
by the ear; heat, cold and contact, by the skin; 
j sweet, sour, bitter and salt, by the tongue; a variety 



I 

II 



— 38 — 

of odors, by the nose, and movement by the mus- 
cles and joints. 

Besides these special sensations there are cer- 
tain general sensations coming from various parts, 
of the body, not always definitely located, which' 
give knowledge of bodily conditions, but tell us 
nothing of the external world, and so are of littl 
intellectual value. 

Discrimination. If all objects were exactly alike 
there would be no chance for the intellect to dis- 
tinguish between things — we could learn nothing,, 
If the intellect had not the power to distinguish! 
between objects that differ, knowledge would be 
impossible. The power by which I single out 
one thing for notice and distinguish it from others 
as a book, among a number of other things on a 
table, is discrimination. If it were exactly like 
the surface of the table and on a level or contin- 
uous with it, I could not single it out for notice, 
or if it were not, but the light very poor or my 
vision defective, the same would be true. That is, 
there must be some discrimination of difference be- 
fore the object can be singled out for notice, and 
still further noting of difference before it can be 
distinguished from other similar objects. The es- I 
sential element, then, in discrimination is the 



q 



— 39 — 

power to cognize difference. This implies, also, 
the cognition of non-difference or similarity. 

The singling out for notice is an act of attention 
brought about by a recognition of a difference. 
The two processes of singling out for notice or 
recognition of a difference and that ot recognizing 
the character and amount of difference, may be 
illustrated by doing both for these two figures. 
The first glance shows that they 
differ, but a longer time is re- 
quired to note the nature and 
~ amount of the differences. Give 
illustrations from you own experience of ability 
to tell that two things differ without ability to tell 
in what way they differ. Also of ability to see 
difference after it has been pointed out but not 
before. 

! It is often noted with surprise that children see 
I resemblances unnoticed by adults, and it is 
j asserted that they see resemblances more quickly 
. than adults. Have you ever noted the fact that 
{ strangers see family resemblance more quickly 
I than members of the family? Have you ever met 
two brothers or sisters that you could scarcely tell 
I apart at first, but after becoming intimately ac- 
j quainted with them you could see but little resem- 



— 40 — 

blance? All Indians look alike to one who is not 
used to seeing them, but not to those who havq 
been much with them. Do these facts throw any 
light upon the apparent readiness with which 
children note resemblances? Can you give any 
farther explanation? 

Since the power to recognize difference is such 
an essential part of all intellectual activity, it hag 
been thought that the smallness of difference thaij 
can be detected may serve as a measure of intel- 
lectual power. In the branch of psychology 
known as psycho-physics, a great many experi-. 
ments have been made upon the discrimination of 
differences in sensations. Sensations differ in 
kind or degree. Blue and red differ in kind, lighi 
and dark in degree. Give other examples. The 
experiments have been made mainly with refer- 
ence to discriminating difference in degree with a 
view to determining the relation existing between 
the amount of the difference between the two 
stimuli or causes of the sensations, and the two 
sensations that are experienced. 

Experiments : Find how much two lines must 
differ in length in order that you may detect the 
difference. Try it with both long and short lines. 
Find how much the height from which a marble 



— il- 
ls dropped upon the table must vary in order that 
you may detect the difference in the intensity of 
the sound. Find how much two weights must 

, differ in order that you may detect the difference. 
Try it for both light and heavy weights as for long 
and short lines, so as to determine whether the 
difference is a fixed quantity or a ratio. You will 

I thus reach the essential truth of the psycho- 
physical law. 

Inferred Differences. Without the power of per- 
•ceiving differences directly felt, knowledge would 

^T^e impossible. Without the power of inferring 
differences not directly felt knowledge would be 
possible but very difficult of attainment, for a very 

1 large proportion of the differences we note are 

- inferred instead of actually cognized. Looking at 
two biscuit I say that one is better than the other. 

^.I discriminate a difference in their visual appear- 

J ance and infer a difference in their taste. I look 

\ at two cubes and say that one is heavier than the 

-other. I discriminate a difference in size and infer 

I a difference in weight. I see that the mercury in 

^ the thermometer is lower and I infer that it is 
•colder. Give a half dozen other examples of 
•different kinds of inferred differences and resem- 

^ blances, indicating what is discriminated and what 
is inferred. 






— 42 — 

Perception. Defining perception in the simplest 
manner possible, we say it is the power of recog- 
nizing objects affecting the senses. The process 
of perceiving ordinarily seems instantaneous, but 
experiment shows that some time is required, and 
analysis reveals the fact that it is a very complex: 
process. It is evident that before there can be any 
perception some sense organ must be stimulated 
and a sensation experienced, and that the sensa- 
tion must be discriminated from others, which also 
means that it must be attended to in some degrei 
at least. I experience a sensation of sound, I 
attend to it in a slight degree, discriminating if 
from other sounds that are being made, then 4 
carry the process further, locating it in the adjoin^ 
ing room and finally recognize it as the chirping- 
of a canary. Not until this is done is the process o| 
perceiving complete. In recognizing it as th^ 
chirping of a canary I really classify it with a kind 
of sound with which I am already familiar, of 
which I have a fairly distinct mental imagei 
There arises also in my mind a visual mental im^ 
age of the bird producing the sound. Give a 
parallel example to this, analyzing the perceptive ^ 
process. In this case the ear is the perceiving' 
sense, but a visual, as well as auditory images, are 



— 43 — 

called up in the mind before the process of per- 
ception is complete. We see, therefore, that 
though perception is a presentative process, yet 
.without some mental image is called up, without 
jthe exercise of the representative power of the 
mind, the perceptive process is incomplete, for we 
have not perceived an object until we have recog- 
nized it as like some class of objects with which 
we are familiar, viz, of which we have a mental 
image. 

Let us take an instance in which the eye 
jis the perceiving sense. I distinguish among 
jother objects on the table a spherical colored 
object, which I perceive to be an apple. In order 
that I recognize it as an apple I must have a men- 
tal image of how an apple looks. Other mental 
images are also called up of how the apple feels 
jand tastes. Give a parallel example, analyzing 
the process fully. 

j Give examples in which touch is the perceiving 
sense. Taste. Smell. In every case note, if pos- 
sible, the kind of sensation, the exercise of atten- 
jtion, of discrimination, the location in space, the 
kind of mental images that were called up. 

Give a variety of examples illustrating the fact 
ihat there are all degrees of definiteness in percep- 



— 44 — 

tion. Some can easily be obtained by trying, 
blindfolded, to identify a number of objects by 
touch, and noticing just how you perceive what 
the objects are and how definitely you can classify 
them. 

In ordinary life we do not distinguish all of the 
characteristics of an object before we recognize it, 
but we recognize it by some one peculiarity that 
we have noted, e. g. recognizing a voice by a pecul- 
iar intonation, a handwriting by a peculiar flourish.^ 
Give other examples. 

Does a child ever recognize a word by its pos|| 
tion instead of its form? Can you give any othdJ 
example in which a pupil recognizes in a different 
way from the teacher? 

Not only do we recognize objects without noting 
all of their peculiarities, but it is even necessary in 
perception to overlook certain appearances of famil- 
iar objects in order to recognize them. That is, in 
the process of perception we not only recognize dif- 
ference, but we overlook difference in order to per- 
ceive the similarity. We become so used to doing 
this that we do not realize that we do it. A circle 
seen at an angle really presents the appearance 
of an elipse, and a square that of an oblong or par- 
allelogram. Yet we have become so accustomed 



I 



— 45 — 

to thinking of them as they appear when perpen^ 

dicular to the axis of vision that it is difficult, 

sometimes impossible, for one who has not studied 

! drawing, to perceive things as they really do 

appear. Give other examples of things perceived 

different from w4iat they really appear. 

J Illusions. In the example given above, where I 

J. perceived an apple upon the table and inferred as to 

how it would feel and taste, perhaps if I were 

J to reach forth my hand, take it and bite it, I should 

get entirely different sensations of touch and 

itaste from what I expected. It might turn out to 

jbe only a painted model of an apple. In 

'this case my supposed perception is only an 

illusion. Again, I see a stick in the water and 

perceive that it is bent, but upon putting my hand 

|over the apparently crooked portion, it feels 

I 

straight. Another illusion. In both cases the 
sensations given to the perceiving sense are the 
same as in a true perception, but the inference as 
}to what sensations the objects would give other 
jsenses is found f^l&e, hence the supposed percep- 
tion is an illusion. The senses act as they usually 
no and the mind acts in its habitual way, but the 
ponditions are different and the mind's inference 
is not verified. Cross the fingers and roll a pea or 



— 46 — 

large shot in the hand. Explain the tactual 
illusion thus produced. 

Another type of illusion is illustrated by this 
example. A meadow lark arises in front of a 
chicken hunter; he thinks it a chicken and fires at 
once. In this case the mental image of a chicken 
is already present in his mind, so that an ob^'ect 
only slightly resembling it is perceived as a 
chicken. Habit and expectation will explain most 
illusions. Give other examples of illusions and 
state how they may be explained. 

Write an essay upon perception, giving your | 
thoughts and observations in ]*egard to the rela- 
tion ot good sense organs, discriminative power, 
attention, practice and mental images to quick, 
definite and accurate perceptions. 

Apperception. In studying attention we found 
that what things or characteristics of things any 
one noticed depended largely upon his previous 
knowledge and habits of thought. In studying 
perception we found that every object had to be 
classed more or less definitely with a group of 
similar objects with which the individual is 
already familiar. It would not be an exaggera- 
tion to say that in reality we attend to and per- 
ceive with all that we have previously attended to 



! 



— 47 — 

and perceived. This process of noting the char- 
acteristics of any object presented to the senses 
and bringing it into relation with things already 
known, is called apperception. It is the process 
oE perception carried a little further, so that the 
I object is not only classed with a group of similar 
, objects, but the relation of this thiug to various 
^ -classes of things is noted so that it is brought 
j into relation with all previous knowledge. An 
J important element in both perception and apper- 
; <;eption is a calling up in the mind images of 
similar things. AVhen a new object is presented 
i we immediately begin to think of what we have 
seen like it, and what that is depends upon our 
previous experience. As soon as we have classed 
it we think also of what we know about that class 
and thus more fully apperceive it. 

For examples of apperception recall how differ- 
^ent your thoughts of certain places were after you 
had visited them from what they were before; the 
(different ideas the names of certain subjects called 
jup after you studied those subjects. Recall your 
jearlier experiences as to how new things impressed 
[you. Reflect upon the different meaning a flower 
|has to a botanist or a machine to a mechanic from 
^what they have to the uninformed. Notice how 

11 



— 48 — 

children are impressed by new things, how they 
relate them to something familiar, and to them, 
similar. Notice in recitation how some pupils are 
better able to understand because of their apper- 
ceptive knowledge. Write an essay upon tha 
educational importance of apperception. 

DIEECTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF INDIVIDUA.L PUPILS. 

Study I. — Perception. 
I. The Problem is: 

1. Why does one pupil perceive more or less- 
perfectly than another? 

2. Why some things better than others? 
To solve this it should be noted: 

1. Whether the pupil manifests superior or 
inferior perceptive power, 

2. What are the causes of this variation from 
the normal? 

Imperfect perception may be due to: 

1. A defect of sight or of hearing. 

2. A slowness in perceiving. 

3. A defect in descriminative power, either in 

a. Inability to note differences or resem- 
blances himself, or 

&. Inability to recognize and estimate 
them when they are pointed out. 



— 49 — 

4. A lack of some knowledge that is neces- 
sary for apperception, 
II. Attention is an important factor in percep- 
tion. Concerning attention, therefore, it should 
be observed: 

1. Whether defects of eyes or ears or an un- 
favorable position do or do not prevent the 
pupil from receiving a strong sensorial 
stimulous. 

2. Whether: 
a. The pupil's attitude is or is not favor- 
able to the maintenance of attention. 

6. The teacher's manner of moving and 
speaking is or is not calculated to se- 
cure attention. 
c. The pupil is or is not fatigued. 
3. . Whether the previous knowledge, the 
novelty of the thing presented and the 
power to relate the two are not lacking 
when inattention is manifested, and if there 
is a lack, what it is. 
4. Whether the pupil is or is not attentive to^ 
the lesson, and if not, to what is he atten- 
tive, to his own thoughts or to something 
without. 
In either case how should the diversion from the..- 



— 50 — 

lesson be explained? How can the lesson be 
made more interesting than other things claim- 
ing bis attention? If the trouble seems to be 
due to habits of inattention, how may such habits 
be broken up? 

CHAPTER lY. 

THE REPRESENTATIVE POWERS OF THE MIND. 

Mental Images. The representative power of the 
mind is shown in its simplest form in the produc- 
tion of mental images. The representative power | 
is good just in proportion as the mental image 
approaches in vividness the oariginal sense percep-^ 
tion. If it is fully as distinct and complete, the 
two differ only in the fact that in perception the 
sense organs were affected by the object, while in 
the forming of the mental image they are not. 
The nervous process in the brain and the activity 
<^f the mind are almost the same. Very rarely, 
however, is the mental image nearly as distinct as 
the original impression. How is it in your own 
case ? 

Leaving out of account general sensations, how 
many different kinds of mental images may there 
be? In your own case which are the most numer- 



— 51 — 

oils? Which are the most vivid? In trying to 

answer these questions notice in what way you 

think of most things; as they look, as they sound, 

as they taste, etc., and which kind of mental image 

is the most vivid. There are great individual 

differences but in the majority of cases the visual 

images are both more vivid and more numerous, 

and the auditory and motor next. Test the vivid- 

. ness of your own mental images and of others by 

^ presenting an object, then removing it and having 

h it described or imitated. 

Can the deaf man form any auditory images or the 
blind visual if they lost hearing or sight late in 
life? Can they if they were always deaf or blind? 
Can you form a mental image of an entirely differ- 
ent kind from anything you have ever perceived? 
A mental image may be of a single sensation of a 
single object, or of a whole landscape, but in 
either case it is merely a representation of w^hat 
has been experienced, without change except in 
vividness and in connection with other objects. 

Imagination. This is the typical representative 
power. The simple mental images of which we 
I have been speaking are the basis of it, and 
, are identical with what is known as reproductive 
imaginative. We may look upon the simple mental 



— 52 — 

images as the material out of which the imagina- 
tion may construct new and more complex mental 
images. 

The construction of a mental image out of ma- 
terial already in the mind according to directions 
or descriptions, is an exercise of the constructive 
imagination. Any modification of the size, shape 
or color of simple mental images, is an exercise of 
the constructive imagination; e. g. imagine a book 
ten times as large as this, four times as wide and 
no thicker and colored blue, or one-sixth as large 
every way and green. 

The representation of any change in the relation 
of things, as of the furniture in this room, a 
building turned around or placed on another 
street, exercises the constructive imagination. 
Grive a description of some building or place you 
have seen. In doing so you exercise your repro- 
ductive imagination. Those who are listening to 
you form mental images of each of the things 
as you name them, and exercise their construc- 
tive imagination in putting together the simple 
mental images so as to form the complex image 
you describe and which they have never seen. 
Give examples of the use of constructive imagina- 
tion in reading, in history, in geography. 



— 53 — 

The child who can represent the appearance of 
a word with the last letter changed exercises the 
visual constructive imagination. The one who 
can sound together two syllables that he has never 
sounded together, exercises the auditory construc- 
tive imagination. The cook who can represent 
the taste of apples, meat, vinegar, raisins and 
sugar combined together in certain proportions, 
exercises the gustatory constructive imagination. 
Give other illustrations, and illustrations for the 
other senses. 

Write an essay upon the use of constructive 
imagination in history, reading or geography, or 
upon means of cultivating it. 

There is still a higher form of imagination — 
the creative imagination. If you will draw or write 
a description of a house or landscape diflferent 
from any that you have ever seen, you exercise it. 
Do so. In doing this you will use your reproduc- 
tive imagination in forming mental images of 
parts of houses or landscapes, and your construc- 
tive imagination in combining them together, but 
you combine them together in your own way and 
not according to the directions and descriptions of 
another. This exercising one's own judgment and 
taste and ingenuity as to how the elements shall 



— Si- 
be combined into the complex mental images is 
what distinguishes creative from constructive imag- 
ination. What kind of imagination does the novel- 
ist use? What kind does the reader of the novel 
use? What kind does a traveler use in his descrip- 
tions? What kind do his readers use? What 
kind does the composer of music use? tlie artist 
who paints an ideal scene ? the cook who invents 
new dishes? the child who makes a new design in 
drawing or writes an ideal story? Give other 
examples of the creative imagination. 

One's imagination is vivid when he can form 
vivid mental images. With some children the 
images are so vivid that they have diflSculty in dis- 
tinguishing them from real perceptions, and so 
may be accused of lying. In other cases the power 
of forming distinct mental images is lacking and 
needs cultivation. Find illustrations of these 
statements. 

Some have good reproductive imagination but 
cannot readily imagine anything different from 
what they have seen, either with or without direc- 
tion, as to how it is to be changed, while others 
readily make such changes, delight in it, and 
sometimes are so much inclined to use this power 
that they are almost unable to give true descriptions 



— 55 — 

of thiogs. Such children delight in fairy tales 
and day dreams, but the others have more need of 
such mental exercise. 

He who can reproduce accurately has a good re- 
productive imagination, he who can construct a 
thing according to description has a good construc- 
tive imagination and he who can create an object 
in accordance with the laws of nature or of good 
taste (as the inventor and poet,) has a good cre- 
ative imagination. Give illustrations that you 
have gained from reading or from observation, of 
1 good imagination of each kind. 

Theme for writing: "Means of Cultivating the 
Creative Imagination." 

DIRECTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PUPILS. 

Study II. — Imagination. One who can reproduce 
i impressions vividly and can modify and combine 
' them in new ways readily has considerable power 
I of imagination — a power that may either help or 
1 hinder him in his studies. 
I. If your pupil seems to be imaginative, note: 

1. Whether he ever becomes more inter- 
ested in his own fancies than in his lessons. 

2. Whether it ever leads him to perceive or 
relate things inaccurately. 



— 56 — 

3. Whether he seems to realize more vividly 
than others scenes and events described. 

4. Whether he remembers better than others 
what is associated with diagrams and word 
pictures, and less well what is not. 

6. Whether he remembers the picturable) 

. part and not the more important truthsi 

associated with it. '^ 

6. Whether: i 

a. He can readily reproduce drawings 
from memory. 

b. He can draw what is described. 

c. He can make new designs, 

7. Whetlier: 

a. He can readily reproduce narratives 
and descriptions. 

b. He can write imaginary ones. 
U, If he seems to lack imagination, note: 

1. Whether he fails to realize scenes and 
events described. 

2. Whether he remembers facts and laws 
as well or better than descriptions. 

3. Whether he understands and remembers 
what he experiences better than what he 
has heard about to such an extent that things 
help him greatly and descriptions scarcely 
at all. 



!ii 



— 57 — 

4. Whether he has diffculty: 
a. In reproducing drawings from mem- 
ory. 

h. In illustrating descriptions, 
c. In making new designs. 

5, Whether he finds it hard to write imagi- 
nary descriptions or narratives. 

III. In the first case try to determine what 
methods may best be used: 

1. In imparting information. 

2. In training the imagination: 
a. To reproduce accurately. 
h. To construct correctly, 
c. To create complex things in accord 

with the laws of nature or good taste. 
lEV. In the second case try to discover what 
. methods of instruction will be most effective: 

1. In giving him a knowledge of the subject. 

2. In developing his reproductive, construc- 
tive and creative imagination. 

Association and Memory. The fact that an hour 
after looking at a chair I can form a complete 
mental image of it indicates that the effect of the 
original perception remains, or in other words the 
I mind retains the impressions it receives. Without 
this power of retention, representation, of course. 



— 58 — 

would be impossible. But something more than 
retention is necessary to representation. Why did 
I not form a mental image of the chair, which 
must have been retained all of the time, before 
the end of the hour, and why is it that I may not 
again form a mental image of it for a week, or 
perhaps never? In this case the mental image 
of the chair came into my mind at sight of the 
owner, who had offered it to me an hour before. 
A mental image of the owner or of his house 
might have had the same effect. That is, the pre- 
sentation or representation of something con-^ 
nected or associated with my perception of the 
chair is necessary to the representation of it. The 
same is true of all impressions, however perfectly 
they may be retained. Association is, therefore, a- 
very important factor in our mental operations. 
Association. A moment's thought shows us that 
no impression is received singly, (except it be 
when the maximum state of attention is reached.) 
When I look at this book I am conscious, not 
merely of the book, but to a greater or less extent 
of the book as on the table, in front of me, in this- 
room, in this building, in this city. Notice in 
other instances whether this is true in your own 
case. Consciousness is a unity, and the object of 



— 59— ^ 

attention is the central and most vivid portion of 
that unity. Therefore, when any portion of that 
unity of experience is reproduced, the rest tends 
to be reproduced also. The same is true of exper- 
iences that occur in immediate succession. Hence 
the sight or thouglit of one thing tends to produce 
mental images of other things seen or thought of 
at the same place or at the same or nearly the 
same time. This is called association by contigu- 
I ity of time or place. Give some examples of such 
; associations in your own case. As a help in get- 
lj ting such examples, have some one pronounce 
j, words while you notice what they make you think 
i;of, and see how many \\ere associated in time or 
place. 

, If the mind were entirely passive what mental 
images are formed would be determined entirely 
by the time and place of our experiences. But it 
is not entirely passive; through the attention it is 
active, and two things that in ordinary experience 
would not be presented to the mind at the same 
place or time, may be thought of together or in 
immediate succession, and thus become associated 
bo that one tends to recall the other. Illustrate 
this if you believe it. 
The mind has a tendency to act in certain ways 



— 60 — 

independent of the external order of things, 
When there is an effect presented the mind at 
once thinks of the cause, and when a cause it 
pictures the effect, although but one is per- 
ceived at the time. This is called association by 
cause and effect. Give examples of such asso- 
ciations. Such associations are often identical 
with those of time. Find some which are not. 

There is another still more important and inde- 
pendent of time and place. I saw a gentleman on 
the street and immediately thought of a friend 
that I knew five years ago at a place three hundred 
miles distant. A slight similarity in the two men 
was the cause of this. This is called association by 
similarity. Give examples of such associations 
from your own experience and observations. 

The sight of a large horse may make us think 
of another large horse, or it may make us think of 
a very small horse, and so we have association by 
contrast. Give other examples. 

Other associations are sometimes given special 
names, but they are less important and are all 
some form of association by contiguity. After 
the first association by cause and effect, or sim 
ilarity and contrast, the two things thus associated! 
are also associated by contiguity. Illustrate this 



— 61 — 

CaD yon tell whht kind of association is present 
in apperception? What part does association 
play in ordinary perception? 

In learning to read what things must the child 

learn to associate? Can a teacher determine to 

any extent the kiud of associations a child shall 
I 
form? If so, how? 

In our varied experience things are not associa^ 

j ted in pairs, but nearly every one is associated in 

I some way with a great many others. This prob- 

. lem therefore arises. When one thing is pre« 

I sented to or represented by the mind, what is it 

, that determines which one of its many associates 

shall be called up by it? Notice what is called up 

by certain objects or certain words and see if you 

can tell why that particular thing rather than 

something else came into your mind. Notice in 

how many cases the explanation may be one of 

the following: number of times the two have been 

associated, the intensity of feeling accompanying 

their association, the recency of the association. 

! Does the general bodily condition or the state of 

I the mind have anything to do with determining 

!what associate shall be called up? 

Memory. Memory is sometimes called thc> repro- 
ductive faculty in distinction from imagination, 



— 62 — 

which is the representative faculty. Memory 
reproduces what has been produced by the pre- 
ventative, representative or thinking powers of the 
mind. It is thus broader in function than the* 
purely representative faculty. It includes asso- 
ciation as well as representation and sometimes it 
is almost wholly of relations rather than of mental^ 
images. I have a distinct mental image of three* 
persons to whom I was introduced last night, anJ 
of their names, but I do not know to which indi- 
viduals two of the names belong, and so my mem^ 
ory is at fault though my mental images are per- 
fect. Give other examples of the difference be- 
tween mental images and memory. 

A memory must be of a real experience, 
while a complex mental image may be formed that 
corresponds to no definite experience. A memory 
is always of the past — one's own past mental 
experience (though the incident may have con- 
cerned someone else or been read,) and to be a 
memory in the strict sense of the word, it must be 
located in the past, or, in other words, not only the 
thing recalled, but also one or more of its asso- 
ciates recalled. Take examples from your own 
experience and decide whether they are true mem- 
ories. 



h 



— 63 — 

To remember, then, implies three things: reten- 
Hon o£ an impression, its recall and its recognUion 
as a reality connected with other realities in our 
mental experience. 

1. The retention of a percept means the retention 
of one or more of the six different kinds of sense 
impressions, so we may say that we have six differ- 
ent kinds of memories. Which kind of impressions 
do you retain best? Have you noticed any one 
who retained one kind of impression better than 
another? 

Most ideas are represented by words, which are 
Tisual or auditory impressions (or if spoken or 
written also motor impressions. ) 

Which do you think you can remember best, 
ivhatyou have heard or what you have read? In 
order to test this, have ten unconnected letters or 
figures read to you at the rate of one every two 
seconds, then have them, or better, another similar 
list, shown to you at the same rate. Find in 
i^vhich case the most are remembered (regardless 
of order, for that is a question of association.) 

' Repeat the experiment several times. To test the 
matter further, find how much time, or how many 
^1' repetitions are necessary to learn a verse of poetry 

rby hearing it read, and the same for a similar 
Terse by reading it silently. 



— 64— . 

In order to find what influence the motor im- 
pressions have, perform the above experiments^ 
either repeating or writing the letters, figures or 
words. 

The general power of the brain to retain im- 
pressions varies for different individuals and 
probably cannot be changed very much by educa-^ 
cation. The time that any impression will be 
retained and its distinctness varies with the num-^ 
ber of times it has been repeated and the intensity. 
So far as retention is concerned, then, the 
improvement of the memory is a question of 
improving perception, and this largely of improv-- 
ing attention. Give illustrations showing the 
effect of clear perceptions and concentrated 
attention upon retention. 

2. The recall of impressions is largely a matter 
of association. Illustrate the part, then, that repe- 
tition, intensity and recency play in the recall 
of any thing to be remembered. 

By what kind of association can you recall best 
time, place, cause, effect, similarity, contrast? 
Notice, in the case of others, which kind is remem- 
bered best. 

Do associations with objects, pictures, diagrams' 
or vivid descriptions help you any in recalling?! 



— 65 — 

What have yon observed of pupils in this regard? 
Is it best to associate a thing to be remembered 
many times with one thing, or a few times with 
each of many things? Illustrate and give reasons, 
You can perhaps get the best illustrations by 
taking some fact in geography or history. 

Associations may be either natural or artificial. 
They are natural when they make the knowledge 
gained clearer and bring it into closer relation 
,with that already acquired. Should artificial 
Associations ever be used? Is there any advan- 
tage in natural associations aside from the fact 
that they are sometimes the more helpful in 
remembering? 

State how you would group the following things 

n your mind if you were required to get them, 

ind why: thread, coffee, gloves, steak, three yards 

i)f blue ribbon, tea, two yards of point lace, ten 

bounds of lard, oatmeal, sausage, bleached muslin. 

The thread should be white; you are to get two 

i)ounds of coffee; the lace must be four inches 

Vide; five pounds of steak and six of oatmeal are. 

granted; the ribbon is to be | in. wide; and of the 

ea you are to get only -| Bb.; and you must get 

wo pounds of sausage; it is the nine cent muslin: 

a hat is wanted and you are to get ten yards; the 



— 66 — 

thread must be No. 36, and the gloves No. 8. Why 
would you group them so? What general princi- 
ples of association are illustrated by your method 
of grouping things to be remembered? 

One of the experiments in remembering words, 
figures or letters should be repeated, noting how 
many more repetitions are necessary to remember 
them in order, and how much this is helped by 
grouping them. 

This experiment should also be tried: have 
seven figures or letters read to you until you can 
repeat them all in order; then have fourteen read 
in the same way, until you can repeat them in 
order, (not grouping them,) and see whether they 
must be read more or less than double the num- 
ber of times that the seven were. What bearing 
has this upon increasing the length of a lesson or 
the amount to be learned at one time? 

3. As already indicated, one or more associates 
of an experience must be recalled or, in other 
words, it must be recognized as belonging with 
certain other facts, before the act of memory is 
complete. Example: A student in geography said 
England has eight times as much commerce as 
the rest of Europe, and when the statement was 
questioned, said, " Well, there was something that 



— 67 — 

was eight times something else, anyway." Give 
illustrations of recall without recognition. How 
can the power to recognize where a fact belongs bo 
improved? 

The opposite defect is often noticed. A pupil 

cannot recall a fact, but if another states it he 

t recognizes it at once, and if a mistake is made he 

knows it. Illustrate this. How may recall at will 

be improved? 

Is a thing recalled best by being seen many 
times and recalled once, or by being seen once and 
recalled many times? Which student, other things 
i being equal, will recite best, one who reads a les- 
son through continuously three times, or the one 
who reads it once and recalls it twice withoul look- 
ing at the book, except occasionally? What 
fitheoretical reason can you give one way or the 

other? What facts of your own experience? 
J 
''\ In voluntary memory attention and will are 

prominent factors, while in spontaneous recall the 

*laws of association work almost uninfluenced by 

ithem. Can you tell just how you voluntarily recall 

What you wish to recall? You can do this best, 

Iperhaps, in recalling a forgotten name. Just how 

&oes your will effect the laws of association so as 

ibring into your mind what you want? 



i 



— 68 — 

Be ready to give examples of individual differ- 
ences as to power and kind of memory; also 
differences varying with age. 

If you recalled all of your mental experiences 
of the past hour, how long would it take you? 
Would it be an advantage to remember everything, 
or is forgetting a condition of a serviceable mem- 
ory? 

Why is it easier to remember certain kinds of 
facts that you have become used to remembering? 
If you will tell why it is easier to remember the 
relation of a certain building to a number of other 
buildings in a familiar city, than in a strange one,, 
you will have a partial answer to the question. 

Write out your ideal of a good memory. 

DIRECTIONS FOB THE STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PUPILS. 

Study III. — Memory, In memory the problem 
and the general method of solution is the same 
as in the stuty of perception. 

A perfect act of memory requires that we shall 
retain, recall and recognize previous mental exper- 
iences. 

I. To retain well implies: 
a. Intensity. 

6. Distinctness of the original impres- 
sions. 



— 69 — 

1. All of the questions asked in regard to 
perception and attention have a direct bear- 
ing upon the retention of the iropressious. 

2. In addition, we should ask whether: 

a. The number of repetitions was suffi- 
ciently great. 

6. The number of things to be remem- 
bered were sufficiently few. 

c. What kind of mental images are used. 
II. To recall implies that: 

a. Impressions have been associated in 

a certain way. 
6. There has been a certain number of 
associations. 
Ton should therefore note: 

1. Whether the facts recited are associated 
in the same way in which they are learned 
or differently. 

2. If differently, what kind of association 
predominates in the recall. 

3. Whether the facts are associated : 

a. With the pupil's own experience. 

&. With each other or given bap-hazard. 

4. Whether the pupil remembers better: 

a. When one fact of the lesson is made 
prominent and the others associated 
with it. 



— 70 — 

6. When association is made with an 

object, picture or diagram, 
c. When association is made with a vivid 
word picture. 
5. Whether the lessons are remembered best 
when facts are associated by: 

a. Time and place. 

b. Cause and effect. 

c. Similarity and contrast. 

III. To recognize that a fact has been learned at 
a certain time or place or in certain relations 
with other facts, is necessary to a perfect act of 
memory. Note: 

1. Whether your pupil recognizes where 
every fact belongs that he recalls. 

2. When he is unable to recall a fact, does he 
recognize it and its relation to other facts 
when some one else states it. 

3. If so, is the inability to recall it because: 

a. The question is not asked in a suit- 
able way. 

b. The facts have not been associated in 
such a way as to be recalled at will. 

c. He has not practiced recalling them. 

4. In any case, what will overcome the 
defect? 



— 71 — 
CHAPTER V. 

THINKING. 

Nature and Divisions. The word horse calls up 
in your mind some kind of a mental image, it may- 
be of some particular horse, a horse of a certain 
color but not any particular animal, an image of 
the general form of a horse, or merely the 
auditory or visual word horse. Notice what 
mental images are called up by the words dog, 
chair, lamp, man and other words. 

In any case the word means to you, not any 

particular horse, but a class of animals possessing 

certain qualities, whatever their color, size or 

breed. That is, you have a general notion of what 

is signified by the word horse and represented, 

perhaps by a mental image of its form and 

perhaps, also, its size and color. This general 

; notion is called a concept, and the power or 

process of forming such a general notion is called 

conception. If you think horses are useful you 

iare forming a judgment in regard to them. If 

you add that they are therefore valuable you are 

Jl reasoning. Thinking is a general term used to 

Jj designate these three processes of conceiving, 

'judging and reasoning. It is specially distin- 



— 72 — 

guished from the processes we have been studying 
by being concerned with classes and qualities 
instead of particular things and sensations. Do 
you see that this is the case clearly enough to 
illustrate and explain it? 

Conception. Perception and conception are 
similar and mutually dependent processes. Per- 
cepts are the material from which concepts are 
formed; and yet as we have already found, the 
process of perceiving is not complete until the 
thing perceived is referred to a class of similar 
objects, or in other words, recognized as an 
individual included in one of our concepts. 
Suppose a child who had seen but one horse and 
has learned to recognize it. Now that horse does 
not present the same appearance to him every 
time he sees it for it is viewed from different 
positions, at different distances and perhaps in 
different attitudes (standing, running, lying down), 
yet his several percepts of it are sufficiently 
similar to enable him to recognize it as the same. 
The mental image of what is common in these 
percepts and that distinguishes it from any other 
percepts he may have, enables him to recognize 
the horse whenever he sees it. Now suppose 
another horse is brought before him. If it is very 



— 73 — 

like it he may think it is the same unless tlie two 
are shown at once. If they are different aud not 
too dissimilar he will still notice the similarity, 
and the same tendency to group and identify 
similar impressions that led him to identify his 
irarious percepts of the one animal will cause him 
to group the two or more similar animals into a 
<5lass. He thus forms the concept of the group of 
animals that we designate by the word horse. 
This concept changes somewhat as the child sees 
more and different kinds of horses. His concept 
is enlarged so as to include more individuals, and 
it is made more definite so that he is not likely to 
make the mistake which he perhaps made at first 
of calling a mule, a zebra or possibly a hornless 
cow a "horse." 

Class Concepts. The formation of such a concept 
as that of a horse has been compared to the 
making of a composite photograph, and so far as 
the image portion of the concept is concerned the 
comparison is fitting. There are certain similari- 
ties in all horses, and these having been impressed 
more frequently than the peculiarities of individ- 
ual horses may produce a generalized image of 
iihe horse. Give examples of other things besides 
I horses of which this might be true, and state as 
nearly as you can how it is in your own case. 



— 74 — 

If we take the more general concept vertebrate^ 
the generalized mental image that represents this 
general notion, is rather vague and indefinite. 
With the concept animal this is still more true,, 
while for such a concept as thing or material 
there is no mental image that will adequately 
represent it. Yet in order to form and keep such 
a general notion in the mind with any degree of 
definiteness it must be represented in some way. 
For man a visual or auditory sign known as a 
word serves as the representative element. Ani- 
mals not having language are probably unable ta 
form such general notions with any distinctness 
because they have no words to represent them,, 
while for the less general notions, man, horse, tree, 
etc., mental images may serve as the representa- 
tive element. 

Degrees of Definiteness of Concepts. In order to 
form concepts of sufficient definiteness for the 
practical purpose of distinguishing between the 
various classes of objects it is merely necessary to 
discriminate that one class differs from another 
class. It is not necessary that one shall be able 
to state the points of difference that distinguisK 
one class from others. Test some children only a 
few years old and see if they are not in some 



— 75 — 

cases able to distinguish one class of objects from 
another readily and to state points of difference 
only after thought or not at all. Or in your own 
case you perhaps can readily distinguish a German 

I from a native of this country, but can you tell just 
in what way they differ? Is a child learning to 
read ever able to distinguish between two words as 
wholes but unable to tell in what way they differ? 
In your own case can you tell the exact difference 

I between the second and the fourth letters of the 

I alphabet and p without looking at them? Give 

, other examples. 

! Where one can generally distinguish objects of 
a class from objects of another class, or knows 
what kind of objects is denoted by a word but is 
unable to state the qualities that distinguish that 
class from others his concept may be said to be 
in the first stage of definiteness. Where he can 
name one or more of the distinguishing character- 
istics we may say that his concept is in the second 
stage of definiteness. If he can name the charact- 
eristics common to all of the objects of the class 

] and not possessed by objects of other classes his 
concept is of the third degree of definiteness or 
perfect. This is true only when he can give a 
scientific definition. Of what degree is your 



— 76 — 

concept tree? Parallelogram? Name three of 
your concepts of each degree of definiteness. 

Extension and Intension of Concepts. Which in- 
cludes the most things, figure or parallelogram, 
oblong or square, animal or vertebrate, mammal 
or horse? Which of each of these has the most 
distinguishing qualities? Notice in giving a 
difinition that besides naming the qualities of the 
class we indicate that it is a member of another 
class, e, g.y a. parallelogram is a four-sided plane 
figure whose opposite sides are parallel. That is 
to say, it has all the distinguishing characteris- 
tics of the figure and three others. In general, 
what may we say is the relation between the num- 
ber of things or the extension of a general term, 
and the number of distinguishing qualities or its 
intension? Give illustrations. 

In forming concepts something of the same 
relation between extension and intension may be 
noted as exists between less and more general 
classes. For example, a little girl two and 
one-half years old had seen radishes and learned 
the name for them. They were red, and when 
some white ones were placed upon the table 
she asked what they were. When she understood 
that they were radishes also, her concept was evi- 



— 77 — 

dently broadened as to number and variety of 
things included, but the distinguishiug cliaracter- 
istics were for her decreased. Give other 
examples. Notice that the decrease in the number 
of characteristics recognized as distinctive means 
not that the concept is less perfect, but more 
definite and precise. 

Modification of Concepts. All of our concepts 
that have not reached the third stage of perfect- 
ness are subject to change with increased acquisi- 
tion and experience. Have your concepts been 
modified by your study of psychology? What 
ones in what way? Without new experience or 
special study are concepts ever modified by the 
way in which we hear or see words used? Illus- 
trate. In what proportion of cases has your 
knowledge of the meaning of words been gained 
by direct association with experience? By means 
of a definition? By the way in which you have 

I heard the words used in connection with words 
you already understood? 

Note this point and illustrate it: to be able to 

j name all the qualities of a class or, in other 
words, to give a perfect definition, does not mean 

' that the concept is perfect unless the individual is 

j also able to recognize those qualities in the 



— 78 — 

objects he sees. In which case will it most likely 
be perfect, where he has learned the definition or 
where he has made it himself ? Which is the 
more valuable, to be able to give the definition of 
a prime number or to be able to recognize it 
instantly? to define a verb or to recognize one? 
Is a concept perfect until one is able both to rec- 
ognize and name the qualities that distinguish it? 
AVhich do you think should usually be gained 
first, the power to recognize or to define? 

Analysis, Abstraction and Abstract Concepts. I look 
at the book before me and, disregarding all other 
qualities, fix my attention upon its color. I look 
at a flower and notice its color, its shape, the num- 
ber and position of its stamens, its odor, without 
thinking of the other qualities when attending to 
the one. I perhaps compare the color of the 
flower with that of the book and other objects. Now 
this singling out for notice one of several quali- 
ties or the parts of a whole is analysis, and the 
thinking of the quality as abstracted from or 
unconnected with those with which it was per- 
ceived is abstraction. After having seen a number 
of red objects I can form a mental image of the 
quality redness without thinking of any particular 
red object. This is an abstract concept Such an 



— 79 — 

abstract concept as this, being representable, 
could be formed without language, ^Yhile the more 
abstract concept color would not easily be formed 
without a word to represent it, and such an one as 
virtue probably could not be formed with any 
degree of definiteness without a word to represent 
it. State which of the following are class and 
w^hich are abstract concepts: building, liquid, 
swiftness, number, honesty, machine. Name others 
of each kind. 

Can you remember any difficulty you had when 
a child in forming abstract concepts, e. g., in de- 
termining the meaning of the word '* large " by the 
way people used it? Have you observed any such 
difficulty in the case of children? In pupils in 
school, a g., difficulty in forming a sufficiently 
distinct concept of divisor, dividend and quotient 
to clearly understand principles in which those 
terms are used abstractly? Give other examples 
from your experience and observations in the 
i school room. 

The distinction between class and abstract con- 
cepts, the one as of things the other of qualities, 
is not absolute. Qualities may be designated as 
belonging to one class of qualities or another and 
^ny class concept is abstract in the sense that it is 



— 80 — 

not individual and concrete— cannot be perceived 
by the senses. To be able to think of dogs or 
trees without thinking of any particular dog or 
tree in any particular place involves abstraction 
just as much as thinking of white without think- 
ing of any particular white thing. 

In forming abstract concepts analysis and 
abstraction is necessary from the first, but in the 
early stages of forming class concept© they are 
not. Could one form concepts of the second 
stage of definiteness without performing acts of 
analysis and abstraction? Why? 

Classification and Generalization. The formation 
of concepts is grouping together a class of similar 
objects or the formation of a class, while percep- 
tion is the placing of an object in a class already 
formed, hence both processes involve classification. 
Since objects possess many qualities, it is evident 
that after one has formed numerous class and 
abstract concepts, he can classify an object in 
various ways, according as one quality or another 
is taken as the basis of classification. I can 
classify my pen as an instrument, as a metal, as a 
pointed thing, as a small thing, etc. Classify a 
piece of paper m as many different ways as you 
can; a piece of meat. In these cases you are 
putting objects in classes already found. 



mt 



— 81 — 



Take a case in which you must, to some extent 
form your classes. Classify all the houses in a 
city in several different ways. Do the same for 
the things in your room. Notice that in doing so 
you must analyze sufficiently to note similarities 
that serve as the basis of classification, and that 
you must overlook many differences and note cer- 
tain similarities very carefully. Which is the 
more difficult to take, a heterogeneous lot of things 
and decide upon a basis of classifying them, or to 
put objects in a class the characteristics of which 
have already been determined? Upon what powers 
and knowledge does success in each of these pro- 
cesses depend? 

I look at a number of script letters and make 
the general statement that right curves are used in 
all of them. I find in multiplying a^ by a» that 
the exponents are added, and make the general 
statement that in all multiplication of similar 
quantities the exponents are added. To make 
these statements I must generalize. The power, 
jthen, to detect similarity common to a group 
! of objects or to form a new class with the char- 
acteristics observed in one or a few individuals, is., 
generalization. Give examples. 



— 82 — 

JUDGMENT. 

I say that lead is heavy or is a metal, or that 
this object in my hand is lead. In the first case I 
assert that a certain quality is characteristic of 
lead, in the second that the class of things known 
as lead belongs to the class of things known as 
metal, and in the third case that this particular 
object belongs to the class of things called lead. 
Every one of these statements expresses a judg- 
ment in the form of a proposition. All perceiving 
and all thinking involve judgments, either positive 
or negative, and if the judgment is explicitly 
stated it must be in the form of a proposition 
having a subject and a predicate. In ordinary 
perceiving and thinking the judgment is made so 
quickly that we do not realize that there is 
any such act of the mind, but whenever there is 
doubt as to the nature of the object perceived, 
the relation between two classes of objects or as tc- 
the qualities of any class, the act of judging is,, 
distinctly present. Give examples of distinctly 
conscious judgments made by yourself and of 
those that are not. 

Basis and Accuracy of Judgments. I look at two 
lines and say that one is longer than the other. 
The basis is the percepts of the two lines and the 



— 83 — 

accuracy depends (1) upou my general power of 
discriminating differences, (2) upon my special 
power of visual discrimination, (3) upon the 
amount of practice I have had in judging the 
extension of lines of that length in that position. 
If I say this line is longer than the one I made 
yesterday, the basis is my percept of one line and 
my mental image of the other. If I say the line 
I drew day before yesterday was longer than the 
one I drew yesterday, the basis is my mental im- 
ages of the two lines. In these cases upon what 
does the accuracy depend? Give other examples. 

Does feeling ever influence such judgments so 
as to make them inaccurate? Illustrate. 

Give examples in which a particular object, 
present or not present, is said to belong to 
a class, samples of which are and are not 
present, stating the basis of the judgment and 
upon what its accuracy depends, e. g,, this is an 
oak leaf. Do the same where one class is judged 
i to be included in another class. 

What is the basis and what determines the 
accuracy of judging of qualities, as: this cloth is 
a bright red; this leaf is parallel veined; this 
j child perceives well ; children are restless? We 
found that differences are frequently inferred, not 



— 84 — 

directly perceived. Are judgnients ever based on 
inferences ? Illustrate. 

DIRECTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PUPILS. ' 

Study IV — Conception. In studying your pupil 
you should, so far as possible, determine: I 

1. The origin of his concepts. i 

2. Their correctness. { 

3. Their definiteness. 

4. The cause of his exceptional ability or in- 
ability to form general notions or to identify 
things as belonging to a general class. 

I. Have his ideas been gained: 

\^ 1. From experience and observation. 

2. From hearsay and reading. 

3. By study of descriptions or definitions. 

II. Note whether: 

1. He attaches the right meaning to the 
word. 

2. He gives it too broad a meaning, including 
too many things because of overlooking 
some distinguishing quality. 

3. His concept is too narrow because he in- 
cludes qualities that do not belong to some 
objects properly in the class. 

III. Note whether: 

1. He understands merely what things are 



— 85 — 

denoted by the word without being able to 
tell anything about them. 

2. He is able to indicate some of the distin- 
guishing characteristics without being able 
to define accurately. 

3. He can state all of the distinguishing 
characteristics of the class. 

4. He can recognize as well as name the char- 
acteristics of the class so as to correctly 
classify objects in it. 

IV. Bearing in mind the results of your study 
of the above points, and remembering that 
children classify things with what, to them, they 
most resemble, note whether in forming general 
notions: 

1. The pupil lacks the power to analyze the 
particulars so as to discover the essential 
qualities. 

2. He lacks the power to abstract those qual- 
ities and think of them independently of 
any particular example. 

3. In either case notice if he is helped by a 
number of examples of different kinds. 

V.^ In identifying particulars note whether the 
classification is wrong because: 

1. He has had little or no experience with 
things of that kind. 



— 86 — 

2. Imperfect knowledge of the basis of clas- 
sification. 

3, Lack of discriminating judgment to dis- 
tinguish the characteristics and identify 
them as those of the class. 

EEASONING. 

Let us analyze a few simple judgments in which 
an assertion as to what is or will be is made not 
wholly upon the basis of immediate knowledge 
and perception. I say "if you remove that staging^ 
it will fall; if it strikes you it will hurt you.'' ''This 
rosy, mellow apple is good." In these cases the 
basis of my judgment must be something more 
than a perceived relation between my percepts and 
my mental images, for in the first two cases the 
judgment is as to the future, not as to what is or 
has been, and in the third as to a quality I do not 
directly perceive. This additional basis is the 
expectation that what has been found true in 
similar cases will be found true in these. Ordi- 
narily this is a mere matter of association, the 
present percept calls up a mental image of what 
was experienced in connection with a similar per- 
cept, and though there may be no distinct recall 
of the past experience, the mental image carries 



— 87 — 

with it an expectation of reality. If however, we 
reflect upon the matter, we know that one basis of 
our judgment is our conception of the general truth 
that unsupported bodies fall, that heavy bodies 
produce pain when they strike human beings, that 
rosy, mellow apples taste good. In all such in- 
ferred judgments we perceive particular things, 
conditions or qualities, we conclude that certain 
j things are true of them because we either implic- 
( itly or explicitly recognize a general tridh in 
regard to those things, conditions or qualities. 
If we explicitly recognize this general truth we 
are reasoning. Our judgment is a reasoned one 
which may be analyzed into three distinct judg- 
ments. 

Two Kinds of Reasoning. The teasoning may 
take two distinct forms. I may say: **A11 unsup- 
ported bodies that I have observed fall; what is 
i true of those I have observed is true of all; there- 
' fore all unsupported bodies will fall;" thus 
I arriving at the general truth by a process called 
j induction or inductive reasoning. Again, suppose 
j I know the general truth, then I say: ''All unsup- 
ported bodies fall; this is an unsupported body, 
I therefore it will fall;" thus arriving at the particu- 
lar conclusion by a process called deductive 



— 88 — 

reasoning or deduction. State the other judg- 
ments in both the inductive and the deductive 
form. Give other examples of each form. What 
is the difference between induction and generali- 
zation? 

General Truths. There is one general truth 
which all minds implicitly accept and make the 
basis of all reasoning. It is that what is true of 
one thing will be true of what is like it under like 
conditions. All other general truths known to 
men have been derived directly from this or gained 
by induction, The general truths that each indi- 
\ vidual knows have been gained partly by induction 
and partly accepted upon authority. In only a 
comparatively few cases have these inductions 
been made formally and consciously, but exper- 
ience has led us to expect certain things under 
certain conditions or, in other words, to know that 
things are related in a certain way. Name some 
general truths that you have accepted upon 
authority and some you have learned for yourself. 
These general truths are often the basis of our 
judgments without our knowing it, and in reason- 
ing they are often -understood without being 
formally stated and sometimes assumed without 
knowing it. Can you illustrate this? 



— 89 — 

In such a statement as this, "Yes, that colt will 
swim, for I have seen several swim when placed in 
the water," the reasoning seems to be from par- 
ticular to particular. There is implied in it, how- 
ever, the general truth that all colts can swim. 
There is always a universal element in such 
inferences only when this universal element is 
consciously recognized is the conclusion a reas- 
oned one in the strict sense of the word. 

Reasoning and Inference. Animals and young 
children may infer from one particular to another 
without analyzing to find the basis of inference 
and the general principle, but this is not reasoning 
in the true sense of the word. The father of a 
iwo-year-old girl blew upon one of two little dolls 
he had just given her, making a noise. She at 
once held up the other one for him to blow upon, 
evidently inferring that if blown upon the same 
effect would be produced. This was a mere infer- 
ence based upon experience. In reasoning the com- 
plex whole is analyzed and what is found true of 
I objects possessing certain characteristics is said to 
he true of all objects possessing those character- 
( istics, and that truth is affirmed of any object 
found to possess such characteristics. 

In the above example analysis of the complex 



— go- 
thin^, the doll, would show it to be provided with 
an opening of such a form that when blown upon 
it always produced a sound, and the induction that 
all dolls having such an opening would sound when 
blown upon could be made. Then the second doll 
would be examined and if the same kind of an 
opening were found the deduction would be made 
that this doll, if blown upon, would sound. (In 
the above instance there was no such opening in 
the second doll.) Give other examples of infer- 
ences by children and animals. 

I could infer from experience that upon a cold 
morning a piece of iron will feel colder than a 
piece of wood of the same temperature, or 1 could 
reach the same conclusion by reasoning in this 
way: "Of cold bodies, good conductors of heat 
feel the colder; iron is a better conductor of heat 
than wood; therefore it will feel the colder." 

If the water in a glass pitcher freezes solid, 
what will be the result? Give a reasoned answer. 

Give other examples of inferences and show 
when they are reasoned, and when they are mere 
inferences based on experience. 

Relation of Analysis and Synthesis to Reasoning. 
Primarily analysis means separating into parts, 
and synthesis putting together. Give examples of 



— 91 — 

mental processes of these two kinds. Since in 
induction the particular things and conditions 
must be analyzed in order to determine what ones 
are the basis of the universal affirmation, that 
kind of reasoning has been called analytic. In 
deductive reasoning two things are put together 
and what is known to be true of one is affirmed of 
the other, hence that kind of reasoning is often 
called synthetic. 

Inductive reasoning is also called analytic, 
because we analyze a particular thing and affirm 
that what we have found true of it will be true of 
all such things. That is, we have discovered no new 
truth but merely affirmed as general a portion of 
what we already knew as particular. In deductive 
reasoning, however, we are said to arrive at a new 
truth by bringing the general principle and the 
particular instance together. This is a logical 
distinction, however, not a psychological one, for 
in both cases we reach, what is to us, a new truth. 
i It is often said, also, that like induction, analysis 
jis going from the particular to the general, and 
Isynthesis, like deduction, from the general to the 
(particular. In reality, however, the word analysis 
fihould not be applied to reasoning at all. Anal- 
ysis is necessary in induction, but its function is 



t 



\ 



— 92 — 

ended when a thing is separated into its parts, and 
the inference that what is true of the thing possess- 
ing these characteristics will be true of all things 
possessing those characteristics, is an induction 
and, properly speaking, analysis has nothing to do 
with the reasoning phase of the process. Anal- 
ysis plays almost as essential a part in deductive 
reasoning as in inductive, for the object must be 
analyzed to determine whether it possesses the 
characteristics of the class, hence calling inductive 
reasoning analytic reasoning tends only to produce 
confusion with no corresponding advantage. Com- 
pare analysis and synthesis with association and 
disassociation, pointing out the parallelisms. 

To illustrate the inductive method of reasoning 
and of presenting a subject, let us solve this 
problem. Find a method of determining the 
square of the sum of two quantities. Let a+b 
represent the sum of any two quantities. 
(a+b)x(a+b)=a^+2ab+b^. I analyze the answer 
and find that I have in it the square of a, the 
square of b and two times the product of a and b, 
and that they all have the plus sign. I know this 
to be the true result for these two quantities and 
I might find it true for a number of other pairs, 
and so conclude that it would be true for all others. 



— 93 — 

I could not be sure of it, however, without some 
better basis for my conclusion than the fact that 
it is true in a number of cases. I therefore ex- 
amine the problem more closely. I see that the 
first two terms must be multiplied together and 
that the result will be the square, since they are 
the same, no matter what the numbers or quanti- 
ties in the problem are, I perceive the same for 
the second term. I perceive also that the first 
term must be multiplied by the second and the 
second by the first, and hence that I must have, no 
matter what quantities are used, the square of the 
first term, the square of the second, the product 
of the first by the second and the second by the 
first. I see also that since the sign of both terms 
is plus, all the quantities of the product will have 
plus signs. Thus, by analyzing the problem and 
applying the definitions of the terms and pro- 
cesses and certain general principles already 

j learned about them, I am able to decide with 
absolute certainty that what has been found true 
of these two quantities will be true for any and 
all quantities. If a pupil is led to formulate this 
general truth by squaring the sum of a number of 

I quantities, he is said to reach it inductively. 

On the other hand, if he is given the theorem 



— 94 — 

and then taught to apply it in a number of differ- 
ent problems, he is said to be taught by the deduc- 
tive method. In the latter case he must analyze 
the statement and apply it to the particular 
problem. Thus: *'I have here two quantities, and 
they are connected by the plus sign, so I have the 
sum of two quantities, and this is the kind of 
problem to wiiich the theorem applies. Now the 
theorem says that I will have the square of the 
first, that would be a^; the square of the second, 
that would be b^; twice the product of the first 
by the second, the product would be ab, and twice 
that would be 2ab; and the signs are all plus so 
^ my answer must be a^+2ab+b^." 

Give other examples of the inductive and deduc- 
tive method of presenting a topic in other studies, 
analyzing the process in both cases. 

The rigidly inductive method is shown to involve 
almost as much knowledge of definition and gen- 
eral principles as the deductive, and the deductive 
to require almost as close analysis as the induc- 
tive, and so the two kinds of reasoning are very 
similar and closely related in all inferences. 

The inductive reasoning of mathematics is dif- 
ferent from that in the natural sciences in this 
respect. In the first the things and processes are 



I 



— go- 
rigidly defined according to the conceptions the 
liuman mind has formed of them, and so are fixed 
as long as the conception remains the same, while 
1 in the second case the characteristics of things 
i are determined by a study of their qualities under 
^ various conditions and the nature of natural pro- 
\ cesses must be discovered by a study of them, 
5 hence the certainty of such reasoning is depend- 
'. ent upon the accuracy of the observations and 
] the uniformity of the laws of nature. 

Conditions Favoring Success and Accuracy in Reason- 
ing. In our general discussion we found that 
analysis is one of the important things distinguish- 
ing reasoning from mere inferences, and we have 
just now found that it is necessary to success in 
both inductive and deductive reasoning. A great 
number and variety of examples are favorable to 
the perception of the characteristics and condi- 
tions upon which an induction is based, but often 
a single case thoroughly analyzed gives a more 
reliable induction than a hundred uncritical obser- 
vations. In mathematics a single case is generally 
all that is needed, while in natural sciences there 
must be enough to determine the truth under all 
i possible conditions and to allow for errors of 
observation. 






— 96 - 

We see also that a knowledge of the char- 
acteristics of the things being considered, (a clear 
concept of them, the power to define them scien- 
tifically,) and a knowledge of the general truths 
about them are necessary in reasoning. We may 
say, then, that the more clear concepts one has and 
the more general truths with which he is familiar, 
the greater his power to reason, other things being 
equal, and his power to reason on any particular 
subject will depend upon the number and definite- 
ness of his concepts of all things included in and 
connected with it. Do you know of individuals 
who are good reasoners upon some subjects and 
\ not upon others? If so, does this help to explain 
such instances? 

Will all conditions favoring accuracy of judg- 
ment favor accurate reasoning? Why? 

Add to the above the power of attention to fol- 
low closely a line of thought, and we have the 
main qualities required in following a chain of 
reasoning given by another. 

To reason independently with success requires 
all these and more. The most important thing 
required is the sagacity to seize upon the right 
characteristic, to conceive of the thing in the 
right way. We found that things may be classed 



— 97 — 

in a variety of ways according to the charac- 
teristic made the basis of the classification. In 
the instance of reasoning about wood and iron, 
they might have been classed in various ways, but 
only when they were conceived of and classed as 
conductors of heat could there be any successful 
reasoning upon the question to be solved. When 
" this was done any one who was familiar with the 
. general truth that iron is a better conductor than 
i wood could readily reach the conclusion. Give 
other illustrations. 

Another power, and one upon which the preced- 
ing is partially dependent, is necessary. If, when 
one thing is presented we had no tendency to 
think of other things like it, independent reason- 
ing would be impossible, however much knowledge 
one might have. A tendency to association by 
similarity is, then, one of the most important 
conditions of successful independent reasoning. 
Can you give any observation illustrating this 
point. 

A tendency to associate by similarity, though 
a necessary condition of reasoning, does not in- 
sure accuracy. When the similar thing is called 
up there must be ability to discern whether 
the similarity is an essential characteristic about 



\ 



— 98 — 

which some general truth is known. Otherwise 
analogies may be taken for proofs. Again, one 
who associates by similarity may note similarities 
and overlook differences equally important. He 
is especially apt to omit negative cases, e, g., he 
observes that it storms when the moon changes 
but fails to note the cases when it does not. In 
order to make an accurate induction he must 
record all cases both positive and negative. Many 
false opinions upon various subjects are formed 
because of failure to do this. Scientific men, 
when they have a theory to prove, often continu- 
ally find evidence of its truth and none of its fals- 
ity. Why? 

A tendency to associate by similarity, however, 
is not even a characteristic peculiar to the reasoning 
type of mind. It is equally characteristic of the 
poet. With the poet, however, it is usually a 
subtle analogy of things as wholes, while with the 
reasoner it is a similarity in the elements discov- 
ered by analysis. Verify this by examining a 
selection of poetry and one of reasoning. 

DIEECTIONS FOR THE STUDY OF INDIVIDUAL PUPILS. 

Study V. — Reasoning. The basis of all reasoning 
is the belief that what is true of one thing is 
true of another like it under like conditions. 



— 99 — 

But since things may be like some in one 
respect and like others in another, the important 
thing is to know and be able to detect character- 
istics upon which the reasoning is based. 

I. In studying your pupil, notice whether: 

1. He knows what are the essential charac- 
teristics. 

2. He knows the general truth about objects 
having those characteristics. 

3. He has the power to discern the similar- 
ity between the particular example and the 
class about which he knows the general 
truth. 

II. When your pupil is trying to follow the rea- 
soning of another and fails, although he has the 
necessary knowledge, note whether: 

1. He has sufficient power of attention to 
keep the various points in mind. 

2. He lacks the power to perceive the simi- 
larity assumed or indicated. 

3. He fails though seeing the similarity, 
to realize its significance because of not 
recalling the general truth known about 
things having those characteristics. 

III. If the pupil is trying to reason indepen- 
dently about something in regard to wlndi lie 

I has sufficient knowledge, note whether: 



— 100 — 

1. He analyzes the case and seizes upon the 
right characteristics. 

2. He recalls the class of similar objects and 
the general truth known about them with- 
out suggestion from the teacher. 

IV. Note whethe-r: 

1. There is any marked difference in the 
pupil's power to follow a course of reason- 
ing and to reason independently. 

2. There is any relation between his tendency 
to associate by similarity and his power to 
reason independently. 

\ Y. Note whether: 

1. There is any marked difference between 
his power to reason inductively — to go from 
particulars to a general truth — and his 
power to reason deductively — to apply gen- 
eral truths to a particular case. 

2. In inductive reasoning, he needs many or 
few examples before he is able to get the 
general truth. 

3. In deductive reasoning he is able to apply 
the general principle to new examples. 



— 101 - 

HA.BIT. 

I. Nature of Habit. Every activity, bodily and 
mental, besides producing an increase in size or 
power of the part exercised, results in a tendency 
to repeat the same or similar acts. This increased 
power and tendency is the essential element of 
habit. 

If such a tendency were not produced by activ- 
ities would any education be possible? Give 
some analogies of habit. State the effect of exer- 
cise upon a muscle as regards tearing down and 
building up. If you conceive of this process as 
taking place in muscles, nerves and brain in every 
activity it will help you in the further study of 
the subject. Note also this point; in the physical 
analogies of habit there is expenditure of energy 
and wearing away or removal of materials. Is it 
so in the physiological and mental sphere ulti- 
mately? Does expenditure tend to increase 'or 
\ decrease the power possessed by the organism? 

II. Laws Governing the Formation of Habits. De- 
termine accurately the relation existing between 
the (1) number, (2) intensity, (3) regularity, 

! (4) recency of the repetitions of an act to the 
(1) temporary force, (2) the permanency of the 
resulting habit. 



— 102 — 

Which produces the greatest effect, earlier or 
later repetitions, e, g,, the 2d and 3d or the 102d and 
103d? Illustrate and give practical applications. 

Which is easier, to form a new habit or change 
an old one? Why? Give practical applications. 

III. EflPects of Habits. Prove by references to 
principles already learned and by illustrations of 
your own that habit saves time. Also that it saves- 
energy (1) by a better direction of it, (2) by 
diminishing conscious voluntary attention. 

Show the practical importance of this in both 
manual and mental labor. 

IV. Habits and Intellectuality. Is continued in-- 
tellectual growth possible through the continued 
repetition of the same acts, e. g., solving the same 
problem? Why? Refer to principles previously 
established. 

Studies are valuable either in developing mental 
pawer or as a means in making further advance- 
ment. In which kind of study are the advantages 

of habit greatest? 

May the earlier study of every subject develop 
mental power and later study make it useful as a 
means of further acquisition. Give reasons. 

Should mental acts ever be made so habitual as- 
to be almost automatic? If so, why? What kind 
of studies or what portion of studies? 



— 103 — 

V. Habit and Will. Does habit decrease the 
number of volitions? Illustrate. To what extent 
are our acts distinctly voluntary? 

Do habits ever prevent the carrying out of vo- 
litions ? Illustrate. 

May habits be a means of increasing will 
power? Give reasons. 

VI. Habits and Morals. Do the laws of growth 
through exercise discovered for the intellect apply 
to the feelings? Produce your proof, being very 
careful that you make the right application of 
those laws. 

What effect does acting contrary to our worse 
feelings have upon those feelings? Should moral 
acts become so habitual as to be spontaneous? 

VII. Special Habits. Mention a number of per- 
sonal habits that are valuable, giving the best 
time for their formation. 

What is the relative value to the pupil of the 
habits he forms and the knowledge he gains? Is 
it the business of the teacher to pay as much at- 
tention to how a pupil learns and expresses himself 
as to what he learns? Give concrete illustrations 
and applications. 

VIII. Habits and Heredity. AVhich exercises 
the greatest influence upon the actions of animals. 



\ 



— 104 — 

the inherited tendencies or those produced by- 
habit? Which those of men? 

How is it that in the same surroundings the 
intellects and characters of people are entirely- 
different? Where they are of the same family 
how do you explain it, in accordance with the 
laws of habit? In doing so is it necessary to sup- 
pose great individual difference at the begiuning? 

IX. Questions for Discussion: The Relative 
Importance of Habits and Ideals in Education. 



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